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I. INTRODUCTION
I intend to talk today about something that everyone seems to be
talking about these days:  The rule of law, or more precisely, what the
rule of law means to us and what it should mean to us.  And I want to
acknowledge at the outset that the discussion may be fraught.  This
week has been brutal for those of us who care deeply about, and want
to believe deeply in, the integrity of our legal institutions.  Emotions
are running especially high, feelings are especially raw, and partisan
fury is coursing through the body politic.  For the last 24 hours, I’ve
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gone back and forth over [if] it would be better to just ditch this topic
entirely and talk about something else.  But in the end I think what
we are going through right now makes it more important than ever to
talk about our commitment to “the rule of law,” what it does and what
it should mean.  I have some strong views about this, and I am going
to express those views.  I will do my best to do so respectfully, and I
hope constructively.
So let me start by summarizing what I intend to say.  One can view
the deep divisions in our legal culture, and one can view this confirma-
tion battle, in partisan terms: Conservatives want one set of judicial
outcomes, liberals want a different set of judicial outcomes and what
we are witnessing is just a struggle about who is going to be in charge.
All the rest is just posturing.  But I think something deeper is going
on.
Over the course of three decades or so, the idea of “the rule of law”
has come to have a particularly focused meaning for judges, academics
and practitioners who are jurisprudential conservatives.  Due in large
part to the influence of Justice Scalia, the rule of law has become sy-
nonymous with a formalist kind of textualism in statutory construc-
tion and with originalism in constitutional interpretation.  The idea is
that these interpretive methods ensure fidelity to the rule of law—
they ensure that we remain a nation of laws and not men in the sense
that judges apply law rather than make it; they follow the dictates of
the People expressed in the Constitution and in statutes, rather than
substituting their own moral or policy judgments.  In Justice Scalia’s
memorable phrase, they have come to view the rule of law principally
as a law of rules.
That set of ideas has a great deal of force and it has had a disciplin-
ing effect on the way all of us approach legal text that I think is posi-
tive.  But I want to suggest that [ ] the dominance of the “rule of law as
a law of rules” idea in conservative jurisprudence has produced at
least two unfortunate consequences, one that is troubling but manage-
able and one that, at this moment in our history, may prove to be dis-
astrous.  The first unfortunate consequence is that it promotes
divisiveness in the legal culture.  It defines other interpretive meth-
ods, and the outcomes they produce, as illegitimate and not merely the
product of good faith disagreement.  Second, and more pressingly, it
induces myopia.  In this very moment in our history, many “rule of law
as a law of rules” adherents are acting in a manner that suggests that
they value the confirmation of judges who share their interpretive
commitments as a higher value than protection of the integrity of our
legal institutions, the legitimacy of which rests on a more fundamen-
tal understanding of what the rule of law means.  And I say that this
way of thinking may prove disastrous because the integrity of our in-
terpretive methods ultimately will mean very little if the integrity of
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the institutions chiefly responsible for enforcing and adjudicating the
law lies in ruins.  I hope to suggest a way of thinking about a shared
commitment to rule of law values that can address both of these harm-
ful consequences.
II. THE RULE OF LAW AS A LAW OF RULES
Let me frame the discussion by saying just a few words to flesh out
what I mean by the phrase “the rule of law as a law of rules.”  In the
late 1980s, Justice Scalia published several essays setting forth his
defense of textualism and originalism as the only legitimate methods
of interpretation.  One of them was titled “The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules.”  At the risk of oversimplifying, Justice Scalia sought to demon-
strate that traditional common law methods of legal reasoning—in
which judges shape the law incrementally by making judgments in-
formed by precedent, case-specific factual nuances, and considerations
of policy, and consequences should be eschewed when judges interpret
legal texts—could not legitimately be applied to interpret statutes or
to interpret the Constitution.
When a judge interprets a statute, the judge should give the words
of the text their ordinary meaning, no more and no less.  The judge
should not seek a different meaning in the legislative history or refuse
to give the words their ordinary meaning because doing so would pro-
duce consequences the judge considers ill-advised or untoward.
And when a judge interprets a provision of the Constitution, the
judge should interpret that provision in accordance with the original
public meaning of the constitutional text, again no more or no less.
The judge should not seek to give the words new or different meaning
based on the conditions or understandings of our own time, based on
the evolution over time of our understanding of broad constitutional
phrases such as “cruel and unusual punishment,” “the equal protec-
tion of the laws” or “the freedom of speech,” or based on the judge’s
sense of the unpalatable consequences of sticking with the original
public meaning.
Judges must approach statutory and constitutional provisions this
way, Justice Scalia said, because that was the only way judges can
reliably avoid substituting their own personal sense of what the law
should be rather than faithfully following the instructions set forth by
the People in the Constitution or by the People’s duly elected repre-
sentatives in statutes.  Unelected judges do not make law; they apply
it.  A formalist textualism in the interpretation of statutes and a rigor-
ous originalism in the interpretation of the Constitution ensure that
judges respect the limits of their legitimate authority.  Here’s a quote
from one of Justice Scalia’s articles that captures this: “Of all the criti-
cisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is for-
malistic.  Of course it is formalistic.  The rule of law is about form. . . .
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Long live formalism.  It is what makes government a government of
laws and not of men.”
Justice Scalia was not the first to make these arguments, but he
may well have been the most effective.  His writings on and off the
bench have inspired two generations of conservative lawyers, judges
and academics.  And he has moved the law.  One way to see this is to
look at the briefs the Solicitor General’s office has filed in the Supreme
Court in statutory construction cases over the years.  If you go back to
the 1970s, you will find that the briefs generally start with an elabo-
rate analysis of the purposes of Congress, as found in the legislative
history, and then eventually work their way around to arguing that
the text can and therefore should be read in a way that accomplishes
those purposes.  But the briefs the Office has filed over the past two
decades or so have more or less the opposite structure.  They first ar-
gue the plain meaning of the text, then argue that the statutory struc-
ture shows the plain meaning is the correct one and then say that
enforcing the statute’s plain meaning will best advance its purpose,
and then they will say that if you want to look at the legislative his-
tory you will find that it supports this result too.
Perhaps nothing captured this better than Justice Kagan’s com-
ment that “we’re all textualists now,” by which she meant to praise
Justice Scalia for his profound influence on how courts interpret
statutes.
III. GOOD FAITH DISAGREEMENT VERSUS ILLEGITIMACY
As Justice Kagan’s praise illustrates, the interpretive approach
championed by Justice Scalia has had enormous persuasive force.
And there has been something very positive in that evolution.  Text
should be the anchor.  It should constrain judges.
But you can have too much of a good thing.  And we do.  Statutory
construction cases often pose hard questions of interpretation—ques-
tions that don’t have an easily discernable “best” answer.  Constitu-
tional cases often pose hard questions of interpretation that don’t have
an easily discernable “best” answer, for reasons too numerous and
challenging to address right now.  The problem with “the rule of law
as a law of rules” is that it tends to make every dispute over the mean-
ing of a statute or a constitutional provision into a battle of first prin-
ciples.  In every case, or at least every case of consequence, the fight is
not just over the meaning of the text.  There is also a fight over
whether the way you go about determining the meaning of the text is
legitimate or illegitimate.  If you are a “rule of law as a law of rules
conservative,” you tend to view a result you disagree with as not just
an error but as an unprincipled transgression against the most basic
norm of our system—the rule of law.
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I experienced this over and over again during my time as Solicitor
General.  One great example is King v. Burwell, the 2015 case about
the Affordable Care Act.  The case posed a question of statutory con-
struction: Did Congress provide for subsidies to help people afford the
cost of mandatory health insurance for people in all states or only in
states that set up their own exchanges for the purchase of insurance?
My opponents in the case argued for the latter.  In their view the oper-
ative words of the statute dictated that result.  In defending the avail-
ability of subsidies in every state, we argued that the statutory text
could reasonably be read to support that meaning, and that read in
context it had to have that meaning both to make other operative pro-
visions of the Act work and because the basic policy Congress put in
place would collapse without the subsidies.  But if you go back and
read the briefs, you will see that they cast the issue not principally as
a dispute over the meaning of a statute but as a dispute over the rule
of law.  For the challengers, a ruling against them would not just be
an error.  It would transgress the rule of law and call the court into
disrepute.  That kind of rhetoric suffused the challengers’ briefs.  And
it suffused Justice Scalia’s dissent—a dissent in a case that otherwise
wasn’t all that close.  The Court rejected the challenge by a 6–3 vote in
an opinion by the Chief Justice.  And if you look at the briefing and
argument in the other big cases of those years—the immigration
cases, the gay rights cases—you will see exactly the same rhetorical
stance.  The opposition is not just wrong, it is illegitimate.
It doesn’t have to be this way.  If each side of this debate afforded
the other a presumption of good faith, I think the tenor of our dis-
course would be quite different.  The debate would go something like
this.  The textualists and originalists would acknowledge that their
approach has its shortcomings, can’t answer all questions and some-
times produces results that don’t make a lot of sense, but they would
argue that their approach beats the alternative because without its
constraints there is just too much risk that judges will impose their
own policy preferences and value judgments rather than respecting
the will of the People reflected in the duly enacted text.  Those with a
different approach—let’s call them purposivists—would acknowledge
the risk of subjectivity and value imposition, and would acknowledge
that it sometimes happens, but would argue that their approach pro-
duces outcomes that more sensibly reflect what Congress was trying
to achieve in a statute or that most sensibly reflect what a basic con-
stitutional commitment means in a world very different from that of
the Framers, and that the constraining force of precedent and estab-
lished process norms limit the risk of subjectivity and value
imposition.
Now I want to be clear.  Liberals, purposivists, are certainly guilty
of this too.  During the Bush Administration, every dispute over the
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scope of the President’s national security power was cast as a fight
about the rule of law, just as during the Obama Administration dis-
putes over major domestic policies were.  But if each side afforded the
other a presumption of good faith, instead of seeking rhetorical and
political advantage in a particular understanding of “the rule of law,”
it would be a lot easier for us to recognize how much common ground
we share.
IV. RULE OF LAW MYOPIA
When we talk about the rule of law, what we mean above all is
that, in the words of the Massachusetts Constitution written by John
Adams, we are a government of laws and not men.  That indispensable
premise of our Constitution’s form of government.
Now I’d like to turn to what I see as the second unfortunate conse-
quence of the “rule of law as a law of rules” movement.  It is to me a
bigger and more threatening problem.  The basic point is this: The
rule of law is not just a law of rules.  When John Adams wrote in the
Massachusetts Constitution that we are a government of laws and not
men, he wasn’t prescribing an interpretive methodology.  He was
making a much more fundamental point.  Under our ideas of constitu-
tional governance, power must be exercised legitimately.  It is an
abuse to wield power for the benefit of those who hold it—be it execu-
tive or legislative power.  We structure our governments and adopt
bills of rights to guard against that kind of abuse.  Everyone, from the
President on down, is equal before the law and equally subject to the
law.  No one is above the law.  At bottom, that is what it means to
respect the rule of law.
The genius of the “rule of law as a law of rules” movement was to
link the movement’s arguments about interpretive methods to these
fundamental principles.  But fidelity to these interpretive methods
isn’t the sum total of the rule of law—far from it.  But right now many
people in positions of power are acting like it is, and that puts us at
great risk.  What I mean is this:  Many of our leaders are remaining
silent in the face of unprecedented assaults on the rule of law in the
fundamental sense I just described, because they have decided it is
more important to ensure that the Supreme Court and the lower fed-
eral courts are dominated by Justices and judges who share their com-
mitment to “the rule of law as a law of rules.”  I don’t think this is
purely partisan in the sense that they are just seeking a court system
that reliably produces conservative outcomes.  I think they genuinely
believe that they are acting on a commitment to the rule of law.  But
in my judgment it is a myopic commitment, and one that poses grave
risks in our present moment.
You can see a vivid illustration of this in the confirmation hearings
for Judge Kavanaugh and for Judge Gorsuch before him.
2019] THE RULE OF LAW 931
Conservative Senators are quite explicit in linking their support
for these nominees to their commitment to the rule of law as a law of
rules.  Here is what Chairman Grassley said in his opening statement
in the Kavanaugh hearing:
Chairman Grassley: “Our legal system is the envy of the world.  It
provides our people stability, predictability, protection of our rights
and equal access to justice.  But this is only possible when judges are
committed to the rule of law.”  Invoking Justice Scalia: “The role of the
judge is to apply the law as written, even if the legal result is not one
the judge personally likes.”  Re the nominee:
[His] extensive record demonstrates a deep commitment to the rule of law.  He
has written eloquently that both judges and federal agencies are bound by the
laws Congress enacts.  And he has criticized those who substitute their own
judgments about what a statute should say for what the statute actually says.
And here is what Senator Cruz said:
Senator Cruz:  “Then candidate Trump said he was looking to ap-
point judges in the mold of Justice Scalia.  He said he wanted to ap-
point judges who would interpret the Constitution based on its
original meaning, who would interpret statutes according to the text,
and who would uphold the rule of law.”  (Versus Clinton who “wanted
. . . a liberal progressive willing to rewrite the US Constitution, willing
to impose liberal policy agendas that she could not get through the
democratic process . . . .”).
Yet at the very same moment that these Senators, and many
others, are talking about the need to confirm a jurisprudential con-
servative in order to protect the rule of law, our commitment to the
rule of law in the most basic and fundamental sense—the notion that
we are a government of laws and not men—is under sustained assault
by the President of the United States.
I can’t mince words about this.  Virtually every day the President
of the United States swings a sledgehammer at our most basic institu-
tional commitments to the rule of law.  I know that may sound parti-
san to some of you, maybe to many of you.  But it shouldn’t and I hope
it doesn’t.  These are just facts, plain straightforward facts.  And these
are the facts:
• The President attacked career Justice Department prosecutors
for bringing criminal fraud charges against two sitting Republi-
can Congressm[e]n (one for insider trading and one for con-
verting campaign funds to personal use) because, in his words,
the indictments would make it more difficult for Republicans to
hold on to those seats in the upcoming congressional elections.
I’m not saying these congressmen are guilty.  Like everyone
else they deserve a presumption of innocence until their guilt
has been established.  But what the President said is that the
Department of Justice should have declined to prosecute in or-
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der to avoid potentially adverse partisan consequences for the
Republican Party.
• The President has repeatedly demanded that the Department
of Justice bring criminal charges against his former adversary
in the Presidential race, against the former Director of the FBI,
against the former Deputy Director of the FBI, [and] against a
career DOJ official who heads the Organized Crime Drug En-
forcement Task Force.
• The President has repeatedly castigated the Attorney General
for his decision to recuse from a DOJ investigation into activi-
ties in which the Attorney General played a part, notwithstand-
ing unambiguous advice from DOJ’s ethics office that the
Attorney General must recuse.  And the core of his criticism is
that the recusal has prevented the Attorney General from pro-
tecting him against DOJ’s investigations.
• The President repeatedly attacks the legitimacy of the Special
Counsel’s investigation into allegations of Russian interference
in the 2016 election and related matters, and demands that it
cease—despite the many convictions and guilty pleas it has
produced.
• The President attacked the FBI earlier this month as a cancer.
• The President has declassified information in applications for
FISA warrants against the advice of his national security advi-
sors who are concerned about harm to intelligence sources and
methods, and threatens to do so again—all to allow allies in
Congress to use the disclosed information to attack the legiti-
macy of the Special Counsel’s investigation into Russian inter-
ference with the 2016 election.
• The President attacks the integrity of the judiciary, describing
those who rule against him as “so-called judges,” and, as a can-
didate, stating that a judge of Mexican descent could not judge
a case against him fairly and impartially.
We have never experienced anything like this kind of sustained
public assault on the integrity of our legal institutions by the Presi-
dent of the United States.  It is not normal.  And these are the facts.
Every one of these things occurred.  And the President continues to
say and do these things.  Now I think the purpose of these statements
and these actions is clear enough.  The President is trying to bend our
nation’s legal institutions—the Department of Justice, the FBI, the
judiciary—to his personal will.  He seeks to deploy the mighty power
of law enforcement against his perceived political foes.  And he seeks
at the same time to ensure that this mighty power will not be deployed
against him, his family, or his political allies.  These acts are the very
definition of a demagogue and the very antithesis of the rule of law in
the most fundamental sense.  Virtually every day, the President gets
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up and swings his sledgehammer.  And with each blow, the founda-
tions of our commitment of our institutions to the rule of law become
less secure.
And what do we hear from our leaders in the President’s party,
both in and out of government?  Well, with a few brave exceptions
what we hear is crickets.  I recognize that it sounds partisan to point a
finger at “leaders in the President’s party.”  But the problem is that
unless and until the leaders of the President’s own party take a stand,
it remains too easy for the President and his supporters to brush off
criticism of his attacks on our legal institutions as partisan posturing.
And I’m pretty sure those silent leaders know that.
I don’t fault the women and men of DOJ and the FBI for their si-
lence.  For the most part, they are keeping their heads down and doing
their jobs as they should be done.  On a substantive level, I don’t like
some of what they are doing—their immigration policies and their
move back toward draconian criminal sentencing for example.  But
those are legitimate disputes about policy that do and should occur in
our system.  Thus far the Department has weathered the sledge-
hammer blows.
And there certainly have been courageous voices in the Republican
Party.  A number of conservative intellectuals and leading lawyers
have spoken out publicly against the damage the President is doing to
our faith in the rule of law.  And what they have done takes real cour-
age.  They have paid and will pay a considerable personal and profes-
sional price.  And some congressional leaders—perhaps chief among
them this State’s Senator Ben Sasse—have had the courage to do so as
well.  But they remain a distressingly small minority.
Now certainly some of this, especially for elected officeholders, may
come down to simple fear of political retribution.  But as I said, I think
it is about something else.  I don’t know what is in the hearts and
minds of these people.  But I think it is a fair surmise that they have
decided that they are willing to run the risks to the rule of law in the
broader sense in order to secure a victory for their view of the rule of
law as a law of rules in the courts.  That is what the “but Gorsuch” and
now “but Kavanaugh” memes are ultimately about.  The Washington
Examiner reported that at the 2017 Federalist Society Convention, at-
tendees were given red stress reliever squeeze balls emblazoned with
the phrase “but Gorsuch.”  That pretty much says it all.
But in response to “but Gorsuch” or “but Kavanaugh,” I say what
value is there in maintaining a commitment to the interpretive meth-
ods of textualism and originalism if the legal institutions that main-
tain our commitment to the rule of law in the more fundamental sense
lie in ruins?  It just doesn’t much matter whether DOJ’s enforcement
of criminal statutes faithfully follow the statutory text if the targets of
that enforcement are being chosen because they are the President’s
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political or personal enemies.  It doesn’t matter much if DOJ or the
FTC are advancing a principled interpretation when they enforce the
antitrust laws if the reason they are enforcing those laws is to harm or
intimidate companies the President perceives as critics or foes.  And it
doesn’t matter much that the enforcement actions the government
brings are based on principled interpretations when the government is
choosing not to bring enforcement actions based on those very same
interpretations against persons or entities who are the President’s
friends and supporters.
Now I want to be clear:  we are not there yet.  But we are teetering
on the precipice.
V. HOPE
And yet I have hope.  I believe that what I have described as the
more fundamental understanding of the rule of law is actually com-
mon ground even for judges, academics and lawyers otherwise deeply
divided on questions of interpretation and results.  I believe most of us
in this profession agree that it is an abuse—a transgression of the rule
of law—to wield the awesome power of law enforcement as a political
weapon against your enemies.  I believe that most of us agree that it is
an abuse—a transgression of the rule of law—to refuse to enforce the
law for partisan political reasons.  I believe that most of us agree that
it is an abuse to call our law enforcement institutions a cancer, or to
declassify sensitive national security information to advance partisan
political objectives.
And I believe that the leaders who have been silent so far know in
their hearts that they cannot be silent forever.  I believe that they
know they are going to have to take a stand.  It will take courage.  But
I believe it will happen.  And when it does, it will be important for
those of us on the progressive side to honor that courage and that com-
mitment.  Those of us who are out there now talking about the threat
to the rule of law aren’t really risking very much to do so.  But those
on the right are taking a real risk.  And we on the other side will need
to remember that, and be ready to do the same when the challenge
falls to us.
I believe they will do this because I believe that at the end of day,
for all the divisiveness and rancor we are experiencing right now, we
do share common ground.  And when that moment of truth arrives
and they do take a stand, that may well be when we can begin to ac-
knowledge again how much common ground there is between us.
That would be something we should all welcome and something we
can all build upon.  At least I hope so.
